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International Evidence on 
Financing of Family Planning  
Background
Family planning is unique among health interventions 
in the breadth of its potential benefits: poverty reduction, 
lower maternal and child mortality, empowerment of 
women, reduced burden of unintended pregnancies, 
and enhanced environmental sustainability by stabilizing 
trends in population growth rates1. However, socio-
economic, demographic, and geographic disparities 
in contraceptive use and access remain wide between 
and within countries, with significant implications in 
terms of unequal attainment of sexual and reproductive 
health rights.2,3,4 Inequitable access, skewed method 
mix, and unmet need are persistent and pervasive challenges 
in family planning (FP) services in many low- and mid-
dle-income countries (LMICs), particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 2,5,6
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The basic premise of a voucher is that it acts as a token 
that can be exchanged for goods and services; a health 
voucher is exchanged for a health good or service, such as 
contraception or sexually transmitted infection testing.33 
To combat inequities in access to health services, 
vouchers have emerged as a strategy for both 
demand- and supply-side financing as part of 
sexual and reproductive health interventions, 
including family planning.7 Since the 1960s, 
more than 20 family planning programs in 
LMICs have used vouchers to serve disadvantaged 
populations and improve access to contraception, 
particularly long-acting methods.8-32
A key feature of voucher programs is that they directly 
link the demand-side voucher subsidy to the intended 
beneficiary and the anticipated supply-side output.34 
Although specific modalities vary, certain broad princi-
ples are common across voucher programs. Beneficiaries 
from disadvantaged or marginalized groups are given 
vouchers that they can redeem at contracted public or 
private health facilities for services.35 The facilities then 
submit claims for reimbursement to the voucher manage-
ment agency. Voucher programs thus improve financial 
and non-financial access to care. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, voucher programs are designed 
with three key parties in mind: a management agency, 
a defined beneficiary population, and contracted service 
providers.36 The voucher management agency may 
be a governmental agency or parastatal commercial 
or non-profit entity. Its primary responsibilities are 
to identify and engage beneficiaries, distribute de-
fined-benefit vouchers, contract providers, and administer 
claims reimbursement. Healthcare providers included 
in the program may belong to the public or private 
sector; they should have the capacity to manage finances 
as they are often reimbursed according to the number 
of voucher clients who are treated (output-based) or 
a clearly defined performance achievement (quality-ad-
justed output payments). Most programs define ben-
eficiaries by economic status, but other characteristics, 
such as being an adolescent or a sex worker, may also 
be applied. In some recent family planning voucher 
programs, community-based distributors (CBDs) have 
used a poverty-grading tool based on household assets 
and amenities to identify beneficiaries.
Increased Contraceptive Use
Evidence of Public Health Impact
Enhanced Equity and 
Increased Choice
As a demand-side strategy that aims to improve equitable 
access to health services, more than 20 studies of family 
planning voucher programs in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America have found evidence of success, with a general 
alignment in the results including increased uptake of 
contraceptive methods among intended beneficiaries 
(e.g., the poor, youth, sex workers), reduced fertility, and 
lower likelihood of contraceptive discontinuation.7,37,38
The early literature on family planning vouchers (or 
“coupons” as they were commonly referred to in the 
1960s and 1970s) contains important operational lessons 
that future research could expand. Vouchers were originally 
used to track the number of households contacted, acceptors 
reached, and contraceptives distributed and to monitor 
subsidies claimed for contraceptive services. 
A 1969 paper noted three advantages of using coupons: 
administrative verification of intrauterine device (IUD) 
insertion; educational or motivational aid to the IUD 
acceptor by reminding the client of the subsidy and 
opportunity to complete the referral; and the ability to 
monitor and evaluate performance of referral agents and 
family planning service providers.39
A recent review of studies of voucher programs observes 
that most have focused on metrics for contraceptive use, 
and not surprisingly, nearly all of them report changes and a 
significant increase in contraceptive use.40 With respect to use 
outcomes, the voucher is a valuable means to tally con-
traceptive service visits. However, the review notes that 
metrics on other dimensions of performance are missing 
Figure 1: Responsibilities of key actors in family planning voucher programs 
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in the literature and synthesis of insights from program 
operations is lacking. In particular, contraceptive discontin-
uation in voucher programs has not been well studied. 
For example, two studies from Pakistan have reported 
that IUD continuation did not differ statistically between 
voucher and non-voucher cohorts at 24 months.26,27 Even 
though one of these studies does find a consistently higher 
probability of continuation in the voucher cohort compared 
to the non-voucher cohort27, the statistically small differ-
ence in actual continuation merits further examination, 
particularly of the underlying program modalities that 
may be responsible.  
Voucher programs can be effective in subsidizing con-
traceptive products and services, and targeting subsidies 
to beneficiaries who, in their absence, would have a lower 
probability of service access and use.7 Multiple studies 
find an observed association between being identified as 
a voucher beneficiary and increased contraceptive uptake. 
Studies also show that vouchers are an effective means 
for governments to flexibly engage private sector capacity. 
Such programs can expand client choice by reducing 
financial barriers to contraceptive services and make 
private providers an option for disadvantaged clients 
previously restricted by cost.7 A study of a voucher 
program in Pakistan found that it substantially expanded 
contraceptive choice for the underserved population at 
which it was aimed, improving equity and access, and 
also enhancing the quality of services available, thereby 
contributing to universal health coverage targets.39
Alignment with Rights-based
Programming
The Case for Using Vouchers in Family 
Planning Programming in Pakistan 
The strategic purchasing of sexual and reproductive 
health services through vouchers can be intentionally 
aligned within a rights-based approach.41 A rights-based 
approach to family planning applies human rights stan-
dards and principles to guide programs to enable individuals 
and couples to decide freely and responsibly the number 
and spacing of their children, to have the information and 
services to do so, and to be treated equitably and without 
discrimination.41 Many states have committed, under 
international human rights agreements and national 
constitutions and laws, to ensure timely and affordable 
access to quality family planning information, services, 
and contraceptive commodities for all.42  
As the above evidence suggests, the public health goals 
of universal access to FP services can be well-supported 
by voucher programs, which are specifically targeted 
at the marginalized or underserved populations whose 
right to family planning services is most compromised 
by financial or other constraints.43-46
Pakistan has a high total fertility rate (3.6 among married 
women), combined with a high unmet need for contra-
ception (20%). Women’s empowerment remains low, and 
levels of maternal mortality stubbornly high compared to 
other countries at similar income levels.47,48
The modern contraceptive prevalence rate is persistently 
low and has remained under 20% among all women over 
the past ten years. The contraceptive method mix is limited 
and skewed, with sterilization and short-term methods, 
particularly condoms, dominating contraceptive use.47 
There are also significant differences in modern contracep-
tive use between the richest and poorest wealth quintiles. 
Pakistan is a lower middle-income country with 37% of 
the population living on less than $3.20 a day.49 Although 
female sterilization is common across income groups, use 
of other contraceptives varies by poverty status. The poor-
est third of the population has the lowest contraceptive 
prevalence but despite economic constraints, 42% of poor 
FP users still procure contraceptives from private sources. 
Figure 2: Modern contraceptive prevalence by daily income levels and source 
citation: http://fpmarketanalyzer.org
Users by income and source (2020)
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Weak protection of sexual and reproductive health rights—notably the lack of practical awareness of local FP services 
and protection from out-of-pocket costs of these services—prevent a significant portion of poor women in the country 
from accessing family planning services.50, 51 Women generally have limited agency in realizing their fertility intentions due 
to constrained decision-making, poor knowledge of available services, or significant financial constraints. Potential users 
are less likely to take up and continue use of an appropriate preferred method. 
Pakistan’s unique combination of high socio-economic inequality, skewing of contraceptive use along that socio-eco-
nomic gradient, and significant private sector role in provision of FP methods to the poor underscore the value of an 
FP voucher strategy to drive progress toward universality in voluntary, informed uptake and continued use of con-
Providers were trained and accredited to offer condoms, 
emergency contraceptives, injectables, and oral contra-
ceptives, and to insert and remove IUDs.54
Community-based field workers were trained to mobi-
lize their community catchment by conducting door-to-
door visits, providing FP counselling and referrals, and 
issuing IUD vouchers to eligible women. Eligibility for 
vouchers was assessed using a poverty grading tool that 
asked women about the number of meals consumed in 
their household per day; the construction of their house; 
cooking fuel; the family’s monthly income; earning and 
dependent family members; water source; sanitation; 
and access to reproductive health services. Vouchers 
were redeemed against free IUD insertion, follow-up 
visits, and removal services.55 
Through social franchised services enhanced by the 
voucher program, MSS reached out to underserved 
women in selected areas in Punjab province to increase 
access to modern contraceptive methods, with a special 
focus on long acting reversible contraceptives (LARCs). 
It had a quasi-interventional study design with pre and 
post phases implemented through an intervention (Chak-
wal), with a control arm (Bhakkar) in Punjab province 
(August 2012–January 2015). The results showed that, 
compared to the baseline, awareness of contraceptives 
increased by 30 percentage points among the population 
in the intervention area. Vouchers also resulted in a net 
increase of 16 percentage points in current contraceptive 
use and 26 percentage points in modern methods use. 
The underserved population demonstrated better knowl-
edge and higher utilization of modern methods more 
than their affluent counterparts. The concentration index 
indicated that voucher use was more common among the 
poor and vouchers seemed to reduce inequality in access 
to modern methods across wealth quintiles.39
Not only is it more affordable to bridge the funding gap 
for FP than for MNH, but doing so would also reduce 
the amount of additional funding required for full MNH 
care, by eliminating or reducing millions of unwanted 
and mistimed pregnancies. This is the strongest rationale 
for increasing investment in family planning, and it 
provides a solid common platform for advocacy and 
justification for additional spending. As illustrated in 
Figure 2, filling in the FP funding gap to ensure that all 
need for family planning is met with modern contra-
ceptive services would result in at least 3 million fewer 
pregnancies in Pakistan every year. This would lead to 
huge savings on associated MNH costs, specifically an-
tenatal and postpartum care; the delivery and neonatal 
costs of unwanted births; and the numbers of abortions 
and related abortion and post-abortion care.
traceptives. Thus far, small scale voucher programs have 
been implemented in the country reach underserved 
segments of the population with unmet contraceptive 
needs. Unlike other countries, these voucher initiatives 
were incorporated in pre-existing social marketing initiatives 
looking to improve financial access to private sector 
family planning services. The two principal FP voucher 
initiatives in the country were initiated by Population 
Services International, under the Greenstar brand, and 
by the Marie Stopes Society. 
Greenstar Social Marketing (GSM), a private non-profit 
organization affiliated with Population Services Interna-
tional (PSI), was launched in 1995 to build awareness and 
improve availability of and access to reproductive health 
services via private sector models across Pakistan includ-
ing in Karachi, Sukkur, Bahawalpur, Multan, Faisalabad, 
Lahore, Gujranwala, Islamabad and Peshawar. By 2020, 
GSM was responsible for distributing more than 50% of 
contraceptives in Pakistan’s private sector.52
GSM operates a large network of over 7,000 clinics 
committed to providing high-quality, affordable repro-
ductive, maternal, and child health services to low-in-
come women. It has trained female physicians and 
paramedics in its network. Vouchers were incorporated 
into GSM’s operations to subsidize access and generate 
demand for its services.53
Greenstar’s multiple voucher model in Punjab used qua-
si-experimental study with pre- and post-phases imple-
mented across intervention (Faisalabad) and control 
arm (Toba Tek Singh) districts. The study detected a 
20% increase in the modern contraceptive prevalence 
rate compared to baseline and noted that the intervention 
positively impacted equity. The integrated approach 
combining contraception with child immunization also 
led to an increase in immunization coverage. It will be 
important for public policy decision-makers to assess the 
usefulness of this approach, as a long-term provision 
of free contraceptive services may lead to dependency 
in targeted communities.53
In 2008, the Marie Stopes Society (MSS), a local non-gov-
ernmental organization, introduced a fractional social 
franchising model under the brand name Suraj, mean-
ing ‘sun’ in English. By 2015, MSS had enrolled 663 facil-
ities in the initiative, which aimed to provide accessible, 
affordable, and high-quality family planning services. 
To strengthen the quality and improve the volume of 
services, Suraj managers leveraged a mix of supply and 
demand side improvements, including in-service train-
ing and marketing, branding, and a voucher scheme for 
prospective clients. 
Recommendations – The Way Forward 
Conclusion:
Building on the experience of GSM and MSS in imple-
menting voucher programs in Pakistan, it would be 
necessary to expand the scope of voucher programs to 
also expand access and contraceptive choice, especially 
with the addition of private sector provider’s access to 
the poor. 
Going forward, there is value in exploring embedding 
voucher schemes them within existing social welfare 
support initiatives. One example of such embedding is 
a voucher scheme being implemented by the Population 
Council in cooperation with the Benazir Income Support 
Program (BISP). The initiative seeks to increase access to 
FP services among low-income women with an FP need. 
The voucher is offered to BISP beneficiaries and covers 
both transportation costs and provider fees.
 
In terms of research needs, there is a paucity of rights-
based metrics for strategic purchasing initiatives like the 
BISP voucher program. There is a need to both validate 
metrics for specific rights and run high-quality studies 
with rights-based metrics as study endpoints. 
Finally, it is critical to take into account the ongoing 
COVID-19 pandemic in the planning of voucher programs. 
COVID-19 is new to humans and only limited scientif-
ic evidence is available to identify its impact on sexu-
al and reproductive health (SRH).56 Home isolation and 
fears of contracting the virus appear to have led to 
decreased uptake of SRH services, increased reports of 
intimate partner violence, and in some settings, reduced 
access to contraception and safe abortion care.57,58 The Gut-
tmacher Institute estimates that the pandemic will lead 
to a 10 percent proportional decline in use of short- and 
long-acting reversible contraceptive methods in LMICs 
due to reduced access. This will result in an additional 
49 million women with unmet need for modern con-
traceptives and an additional 15 million unintended 
pregnancies over the course of a year.59 While creative 
measures are needed to reverse these trends, safety 
concerns must also be prioritized. Therefore, to the 
extent possible, voucher programs should incorpo-
rate mobile solutions for beneficiary identification, 
pre-counseling (priming), referral (e-pharmacy), and 
post-service accountability. 
To meet the FP2020 and Sustainable Development Goals, significant investments are required by countries and 
donors in priority areas, including sustainable financing, reaching all adolescents, expanding availability 
of services to the poorest and hard-to-reach populations, and improving the quality and increasing the range of 
methods available.60
Studies have shown that vouchers can substantially contribute to SDG goals by expanding contraceptive access 
and choice among the underserved populations. Vouchers can be a good financing tool to enhance equity, increase 
access, and improve the quality of FP services available to underserved populations within the country.
Table 1: Operationalizing sexual and reproductive health rights in family planning programs (Source: Cole et al 2019)
 SRHR  Implications for FP programs
Accessibility 
Geographic, physical, financial, and policy access (i.e., 
absence of nonmedical eligibility criteria); information is 
understood; continuous contraceptive security; suitable 
operational schedule; service integration to avoid missed 
opportunities.
Acceptability
Culturally appropriate facilities, methods, and services; 
community/family support for women’s ability to choose, 
switch, or stop method of contraception; tolerance of 
side effects; privacy and confidentiality respected; client 
satisfaction with services. Ensuring client privacy and 
confidentiality. 
Accountability
Mechanisms exist for community members and family 
planning clients to provide input and feedback about 
services, and for health system to investigate and remedy 
allegations of or confirmed violations of rights; members 
of the community are involved in planning and moni-
toring family planning services; good governance and 
effective implementation, providing an environment 
that facilitates the discharge of all responsibilities; and the 




Knowledge that one has the right to make decisions 
about health care; ability to make one’s own decisions 
independent of system, husband, family, or community 
pressures; informed, voluntary decision making support-
ed; meaningful participation of clients in program design 
and monitoring; client-controlled methods offered; 
supportive community gender norms; women, men, and 
young people know they can ask for services based on 
their needs, within their rights.
Availability Broad choice of methods offered; sufficient and needs-based distribution at functioning service delivery points
Informed 
choice
Women and youth and all clients make own decisions 
about whether and what method of family planning to 
use, without pressure from anyone, with free access to 
accurate information they can understand and a range of 
options to choose from.
Nondiscrimi-
nation
Everyone, no matter what group they identify with, their 
age, or any other circumstance, has the same access to 
quality information and services; everyone is treated 
fairly and equitably.
Quality
Service providers are well trained and provide safe services, 
treat clients with respect, provide good counseling, and 
protect client privacy and confidentiality (ensuring client 
information cannot be observed by anyone else without 
client’s consent; ensuring client records are not dis-
closed); stock a regular supply of contraceptives and all 
necessary equipment to provide the services clients want.
  How vouchers act to improve SRHR
• Financial access improved via the voucher subsidy.
• Geographic access improved via community-based  
    distribution of vouchers and transport subsidy, if part
    of the package.
• Information access improved via CBD /LHW interper sonal   
    communication. 
• Client satisfaction is solicited and factored into provider  
     reimbursement or contract renewal.
• Voucher benefits package includes LARC removal
• Contracted providers meet standards for confidentiality.
• Client experience is solicited and factored into prov ider 
     reimbursement or contract renewal.
• Management agency has means to investigate and 
    remedy allegations of or confirmed violations of rights
• Voucher distribution is done by trusted community 
    members.
•  Routine data is used to monitor service delivery and  
     adherence to standards.
• Community-based voucher distribution supports  
    notion that client controls process and communities   
    accept that CBDs can perform their duties.
• Broad choice of methods offered in voucher benefits 
    package.
• Providers contracted to ensure sufficient contraceptive    
     supplies.
• Choice optimized if client perceived quality (MII+) is  
     linked to provider reimbursement
• Voucher benefits package optimizes on number of methods
• Providers incentivized to deliver a broad method mix
• Community-based distribution of vouchers to  
    disadvantaged populations addresses this point.
• Provider accreditation in the voucher program is 
    predicated on meeting standards.
• Voucher clients are solicited for feedback on the quality
    of their experience.
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